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ABSTRACT 
 
The Microeconometric Estimation of 
Treatment Effects - An Overview
∗
 
The need to evaluate the performance of active labour market policies is not questioned any 
longer. Even though OECD countries spend significant shares of national resources on these 
measures, unemployment rates remain high or even increase. We focus on 
microeconometric evaluation which has to solve the fundamental evaluation problem and 
overcome the possible occurrence of selection bias. When using non-experimental data, 
different evaluation approaches can be thought of. The aim of this paper is to review the most 
relevant estimators, discuss their identifying assumptions and their (dis-)advantages. 
Thereby we will present estimators based on some form of exogeneity (selection on 
observables) as well as estimators where selection might also occur on unobservable 
characteristics. Since the possible occurrence of effect heterogeneity has become a major 
topic in evaluation research in recent years, we will also assess the ability of each estimator 
to deal with it. Additionally, we will also discuss some recent extensions of the static 
evaluation framework to allow for dynamic treatment evaluation. 
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 1 Introduction
The need to evaluate the performance of active labour market policies (ALMP) is
not questioned any longer. Even though OECD countries spend signi¯cant shares
of national resources on these measures, unemployment rates remain high or even
increase. The ideal evaluation process can be looked at as a series of three steps (Fay,
1996): First, the impacts of the programme on the individual should be estimated
(microeconometric evaluation). Second, it should be examined if the impacts
are large enough to yield net social gains (macroeconomic evaluation). Third,
it should be answered if this is the best outcome that could have been achieved
for the money spent (cost-benefit analysis). In this paper we focus on the
¯rst step. The main question in microeconometric evaluation is if the outcome for
an individual is a®ected by the participation in an ALMP programme or not. We
would like to know the di®erence between the value of the participant's outcome
in the actual situation and the value of the outcome if he had not participated in
the programme. The fundamental evaluation problem arises because we can never
observe both states (participation and non-participation) for the same individual
at the same time, i.e. one of the states is counterfactual. Therefore ¯nding an
adequate control group is necessary to make a comparison possible. This is not an
easy task because participants in programmes usually di®er in more aspects than
just participation from non-participants. Taking simply the di®erence between their
outcomes after treatment will not reveal the true treatment impact, i.e. will lead to
a selection bias.
Microeconometric evaluation has been hampered for a long time, since the available
data was not rich enough to allow drawing policy-relevant conclusions. However,
in recent years there has been made a lot of progress in enabling researchers to
use administrative data for evaluation purposes.1 Depending on the data at hand,
di®erent evaluation strategies can be thought of. Whenever feasible, experimental
evaluation will provide the most compelling evidence in most cases. The basic
idea of this approach is to assign individuals randomly to the participants' and the
control group. Both groups then di®er only with respect to participation and the
di®erences in the outcomes can be taken as treatment e®ects. However, in most
European countries experimental data are not available and therefore the evaluator
must choose among non-experimental evaluation estimators.2
A lot of methodological progress has been made to develop and justify non-experimen-
tal evaluation estimators which are based on econometric and statistical methods
to solve the fundamental evaluation problem (see e.g. Heckman and Robb (1985b),
Heckman and Hotz (1989) or Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999)). In non-
experimental studies, the data are not derived in a process that is completely under
the control of the researcher. Instead one has to rely on information how individu-
als actually performed after the intervention. That is, we observe the outcome with
1See e.g. Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2005) for Germany, Sianesi (2004) for Sweden, Ger¯n
and Lechner (2002) for Switzerland or van den Berg, van der Klaauw, and van Ours (2004) for the
Netherlands.
2Hence, we will not discuss experimental estimators in this paper. The interested reader is
referred to Burtless (1995) and Heckman and Smith (1995).
1treatment for participants and the outcome without treatment for non-participants.
The objective of observational studies is to use this information to restore the com-
parability of both groups by design. The aim of this paper is to give an overview of
the most relevant evaluation approaches and provide some guidance to researchers
on how to choose between them. Thereby we will also discuss the possible occur-
rence of e®ect heterogeneity, which has become a major focus in evaluation research
in the last years, and the ability of each estimator to deal with it.
The di®erent estimators can be classi¯ed with respect to two dimensions. The ¯rst
dimension is the required data for their implementation, where we can distinguish
between longitudinal and cross-sectional methods. The second dimension concerns
the handling of selection bias, where two categories arise. The ¯rst category contains
approaches that rely on the so-called unconfoundedness or selection on observables
assumption, like matching, regression and regression discontinuity models. If one
believes that the available data is not rich enough to justify this assumption, he
has to rely on the second category of estimators which explicitly allows selection on
unobservables, too. The methods of instrumental variables and selection models as
well as the di®erence-in-di®erences estimator will be presented for that situation.
Additionally, we will also present some recent extensions of the static evaluation
framework to dynamic concepts. Here we will discuss sequential matching estima-
tors, duration models and matching with time-varying treatment indicators.
The paper is organised as follows: First, we are going to introduce the evaluation
framework in section 2, where we especially present the potential outcome approach,
discuss parameters of interest, selection bias on observable and on unobservable
characteristics as well as heterogeneous treatment e®ects. In section 3 we will present
di®erent evaluation strategies and section 4 concludes.
2 The Evaluation Framework
2.1 Potential Outcome Approach and the Fundamental Eval-
uation Problem
Inference about the impact of a treatment on the outcome of an individual involves
speculation about how this individual would have performed in the labour market,
had he not received the treatment.3 The framework serving as a guideline for the
empirical analysis of this problem is the potential outcome approach, also known as
the Roy(1951)-Rubin(1974)-model.
The main pillars of this model are individuals, treatment (participating in a pro-
gramme or not) and potential outcomes, that are also called responses.4 In the basic
3This is clearly di®erent from asking whether there is an empirical association between treatment
and the outcome (Lechner, 2000). See Holland (1986) for an extensive discussion of concepts of
causality in statistics, econometrics and other ¯elds.
4It should be clear, that this framework is not restricted to the evaluation of labour market
programmes. It applies for every situation where one group of units, e.g. individuals or ¯rms or
other entities, receive some form of treatment and others do not.
2model there are two potential outcomes (Y 1;Y 0) for each individual, where Y 1 in-
dicates a situation with treatment and Y 0 without. To complete the notation, we
additionally denote variables that are una®ected by treatments by X. Attributes
X are exogenous in the sense that their potential values for di®erent treatment
states coincide (Holland, 1986). Furthermore we de¯ne a binary assignment indica-
tor D, indicating whether an individual actually received treatment (D = 1), or not
(D = 0). The treatment e®ect for each individual i is then de¯ned as the di®erence
between his potential outcomes:
¢i = Y
1
i ¡ Y
0
i : (1)
The fundamental problem of evaluating this individual treatment e®ect arises be-
cause the observed outcome for each individual is given by:
Yi = DiY
1
i + (1 ¡ Di)Y
0
i : (2)
This means that for those individuals who participated in treatment we observe Y 1
and for those who did not participate we observe Y 0. Unfortunately, we can never
observe Y 1 and Y 0 for the same individual simultaneously and therefore we cannot
estimate (1) directly. The unobservable component in (1) is called the counterfactual
outcome.
Concentration on a single individual requires that the e®ect of the intervention on
each individual is not a®ected by the participation decision of any other individual,
i.e. the treatment e®ect ¢i for each person is independent of the treatment of other
individuals. In statistical literature this is referred to as the stable unit treatment
value assumption (SUTVA)5 and guarantees that average treatment e®ects can be
estimated independently of the size and composition of the treatment population.
In particular, it excludes peer-e®ects as well as cross-e®ects and general equilibrium
e®ects (Sianesi, 2004).
2.2 Treatment E®ects and Selection Bias
Since there will never be an opportunity to estimate individual e®ects in (1) with
con¯dence, we have to concentrate on population averages of gains from treatment.
Two treatment e®ects are most frequently estimated in empirical studies. The ¯rst
one is the (population) average treatment e®ect (ATE), which is simply the di®erence
of the expected outcomes after participation and non-participation:
¢ATE = E(¢) = E(Y
1) ¡ E(Y
0): (3)
This e®ect answers the question which would be the outcome if individuals in the
population were randomly assigned to treatment. Heckman (1997) notes that this
estimate might not be of relevance to policy makers because it includes the e®ect on
persons for whom the programme was never intended. Therefore, the most impor-
tant evaluation parameter is the so called average treatment e®ect on the treated
5See Holland (1986) for a further discussion of this concept.
3(ATT), which focusses explicitly on the e®ects on those for whom the programme
is actually intended.6 It is given by:
¢ATT = E(¢ j D = 1) = E(Y
1 j D = 1) ¡ E(Y
0 j D = 1): (4)
In the sense that this parameter focuses directly on participants, it determines the
realised gross gain from the programme and can be compared with its costs, help-
ing to decide whether the programme is successful or not (Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith, 1999). Given equation (4), the problem of selection bias can be straightfor-
wardly seen. Remember that the second term on the right hand side of equation
(4) is unobservable as it describes the hypothetical outcome without treatment for
those individuals who received treatment. If the condition E(Y 0 j D = 1) = E(Y 0 j
D = 0) holds, we can use the non-participants as an adequate control group. This
identifying assumption is likely to hold only in randomised experiments. With non-
experimental data it will usually not hold, i.e. E(Y 0 j D = 1) 6= E(Y 0 j D = 0):
Consequently, estimating ATT by the di®erence in sub-population means of par-
ticipants E(Y 1 j D = 1) and non-participants E(Y 0 j D = 0) will therefore lead
to a selection bias. Selection bias arises because participants and non-participants
are selected groups that would have di®erent outcomes, even in absence of the pro-
gramme. It might be caused by observable factors, like age or skill di®erences, or
unobservable factors like motivation.
2.3 Potential Outcome Framework and Econometric Method-
ology
For the further discussion it will be helpful to relate the potential outcome framework
to familiar econometric notation. To do so, we follow Blundell and Costa Dias (2002)
and de¯ne the following outcome equations:
Y
1
it = g
1
t(Xi) + U
1
it and Y
0
it = g
0
t(Xi) + U
0
it; (5)
where the subscripts i and t index the individual and the time period, respectively.
The functions g0 and g1 represent the relationship between potential outcomes and
the set of observable characteristics. U0 and U1 are error terms which have zero
mean and are assumed to be uncorrelated with regressors X. For the familiar case
of linear regression, the g functions specialise to g1(X) = X¯1, and g0(X) = X¯0.
Heckman and Robb (1985a) note that the decision to participate in treatment may
be determined by a prospective trainee, by a programme administrator, or both.
Whatever the speci¯c content of the rule, it can be described in terms of an in-
dex function framework. Let INi be an index of bene¯ts to the relevant decision
6Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) discuss further parameters, like the proportion of par-
ticipants who bene¯t from the programme or the distribution of gains at selected base state values
or the treatment e®ect on the untreated. For distributions of programme impacts, the interested
reader is referred to Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997).
4maker from participating in the programme. It is a function of observed (Zi) and
unobserved (Vi) variables. Therefore
INi = f(Zi) + Vi; (6)
with enrolment in the programme Di given by
Di = 1 if INi > 0 and
= 0 otherwise:
Under this speci¯cation and the further assumption that treatment takes place in
period k, one can de¯ne the individual-speci¯c treatment e®ect for any Xi as:
¢it(Xi) = Y
1
it ¡ Y
0
it = [g
1
t(Xi) ¡ g
0
t(Xi)] + [U
1
it ¡ U
0
it] with t > k: (7)
The ATT measured in the post-treatment period t > k is then de¯ned as:
¢ATT = E(¢it j X = Xi;Di = 1): (8)
The assignment process to treatment is most probably not random. Consequently,
the assignment process will lead to non-zero correlation between enrolment (Di) and
the outcome's error term (U1;U0). This may occur because of stochastic dependence
between (U1;U0) and Vi in (6) or because of stochastic dependence between (U1;U0)
and Zi. In the former case we have selection on unobservables, whereas in the latter
case selection on observables is prevalent (Heckman and Robb, 1985b).
2.4 Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous Treatment E®ects
The discussion in the previous subsection allows us to consider the problem of ho-
mogeneous and heterogeneous treatment e®ects in a common and intuitive way. In
recent years a substantial conceptual progress has been made to introduce models
in which the impact of a programme is allowed to di®er across individuals.7 The
impacts are homogeneous if we assume the e®ect to be constant across individuals,
i.e.:
¢t = ¢it(Xi) = g
1
t(Xi) ¡ g
0
t(Xi) with t > k (9)
for any i. This implies that g1 and g0 are two parallel curves that di®er only in the
level and, furthermore, that participation-speci¯c error terms are not a®ected by the
treatment status. The outcomes stated in equation (5) can therefore be re-written
as (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002):
Yit = g
0
t(Xi) + ¢tDit + Ui: (10)
However, if the treatment impact varies across individuals this may come systemat-
ically through the observables' component or be part of the unobservables. In this
case equation (5) changes to:
Yit = g
0
t(Xi) + ¢t(Xi)Dit + [U
0
it + Dit(U
1
it ¡ U
0
it)]; (11)
7See e.g. the discussion in Smith (2000).
5where
¢t(Xi) = E[¢it(Xi)] = g
1
t(Xi) ¡ g
0
t(Xi) (12)
is the expected treatment e®ect at time t for individuals characterised by Xi (Blundell
and Costa Dias, 2002). If programme impacts are heterogeneous, negative average
e®ects must not apply for all strata of the population (Manski, 1997 and 2000).
Since abandoning the `common e®ect' assumption and identifying the individuals
that bene¯t from programmes provides some scope to improve their future e±ciency,
we will assess for each estimation method that we will present in the following its
capability to deal with heterogeneous treatment e®ects.
3 Non-Experimental Evaluation Methods
The discussion in subsections 2.2 and 2.3 has made clear that the problem of selec-
tion bias is a severe one and cannot be solved with more data, since the fundamental
evaluation problem will not disappear. We have a distorted representation of a true
population in a sample as a consequence of a sampling rule, which is the essence
of the selection problem (Heckman, 2001). Hence, we have to use some identifying
assumptions to draw inference about the hypothetical population based on the ob-
served population. In the following subsections we will present several evaluation
approaches. Each approach invokes di®erent identifying assumptions to construct
the required counterfactual outcome. We will start the following discussion with two
estimators (matching and regression) that are based on the selection on observables
assumption.8 Following that we introduce three estimators that allow for selection
on unobservables, too, namely di®erence-in-di®erences, instrumental variables and
selection models. Finally, we also brie°y discuss regression discontinuity models and
the estimation of treatment e®ects in a dynamic framework.
3.1 Matching Estimator
Matching is based on the identifying assumption that conditional on some covariates
X, the outcome Y is independent of D. In the notation of Dawid (1979), it assumes
that:
Assumption 1 Unconfoundedness: Y 0;Y 1 q D j X;
where q denotes independence. If assumption 1 is true, then F(Y 0 j X;D = 1) =
F(Y 0 j X;D = 0) and F(Y 1 j X;D = 1) = F(Y 1 j X;D = 0). This means, that
conditional on X, non-participant outcomes have the same distribution that partic-
ipants would have experienced if they had not participated in the programme and
8See Imbens (2004) for an extensive overview of estimating average treatment e®ects under
unconfoundedness.
6vice versa (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). Similar to randomisation in a clas-
sical experiment, matching balances the distributions of all relevant, pre-treatment
characteristics X in the treatment and comparison group.9 Thus it achieves inde-
pendence between the potential outcomes and the assignment to treatment. Hence,
if the mean exists, E(Y 0 j X;D = 1) = E(Y 0 j X;D = 0) = E(Y 0 j X),
E(Y 1 j X;D = 1) = E(Y 1 j X;D = 0) = E(Y 1 j X) and the missing coun-
terfactual means can be constructed from the outcomes of non-participants and
participants. In order for both expressions to be well de¯ned simultaneously for all
X, it is additionally assumed that
Assumption 2 Overlap: 0 < Pr(D = 1 j X) < 1;
for all X. This implies that the support of X is equal in both groups, i.e. S =
Support(XjD = 1) = Support(XjD = 0).10 Assumption 2 prevents X from being
a perfect predictor in the sense that we can ¯nd for each participant a counterpart
in the non-treated population and vice versa. If there are regions where the sup-
port of X does not overlap for the treated and non-treated individuals, matching
has to be performed over the common support region only. The estimated e®ects
have then to be rede¯ned as the mean treatment e®ect for those individuals falling
within the common support (Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi, 2004). Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) call assumptions 1 and 2 together `strong ignorability'. Under
`strong ignorability' ATE in (3) and ATT in (4) can be de¯ned for all values of X.
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) demonstrate that these conditions are overly
strong and all that is needed for estimation of (3) and (4) is mean-independence.
Additionally, if one is interested in estimating ATT only, the assumptions can be
relaxed in a di®erent direction, because one needs only to assume Y 0 q D j X and
the weaker overlap assumption P(D = 1 j X) < 1: The mean impact of treatment
on the treated can be written as:
¢
MAT
ATT = E(Y
1jX;D = 1) ¡ EX[E(Y
0jX;D = 0)jD = 1]; (13)
where the ¯rst term can be estimated from the treatment group and the second term
from the mean outcomes of the matched comparison group. The outer expectation
is taken over the distribution of X in the treated population. The method of match-
ing can also be used to estimate ATT at some points X = x, where x is a particular
realisation of X. Before we move on to the next estimator, let us brie°y mention
two things. First, it should be clear that conditioning on all relevant covariates is
limited in case of a high dimensional vector X. For that case Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) suggest the use of so-called balancing scores to overcome this dimensionality
problem. One possible balancing score is the propensity score and matching pro-
cedures based on this balancing score are known as propensity score matching.11
9If we say relevant we mean all those covariates that in°uence the assignment to treatment as
well as the potential outcomes.
10The support is a statistical term meaning the set of values for which a density function is
non-zero, i.e. the set of values of a variable that one observes with positive probability (Hui and
Smith, 2002).
11See Rosenbaum (2002) or Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) for an introduction into propensity
score matching estimators and some guidance for their implementation.
7Second, there are several di®erent matching algorithms suggested in the literature,
e.g. kernel or nearest-neighbour matching, and the choice between them is not trivial
since it involves a trade-o® between bias and variance. We will not discuss these
algorithms here (see Smith and Todd (2005) for an overview.)
3.2 Linear Regression Approach
Even though regression and matching both rely on the unconfoundedness assump-
tion, there are some key di®erences between both approaches which are worth dis-
cussing. One key di®erence is that matching, due to its non-parametric nature,
avoids functional form assumptions implicit in linear regression models. Basically,
linear regression makes the additional assumption that simply conditioning linearly
on X su±ces to eliminate selection bias. We have already introduced the linear
regression notation in subsection 2.3, let us reconsider the main points. For no-
tational convenience we drop the individual subscript i and the time subscript t.
Hence, the potential outcomes in a linear regression framework can be written as
Y 1 = X¯1 + U1 and Y 0 = X¯0 + U0 and ATT under regression is given by:
¢
Reg
ATT = E(Y
1 ¡ Y
0jX;D = 1) = X(¯1 ¡ ¯0) + E(U
1 ¡ U
0jX;D = 1): (14)
The identifying assumption needed to justify regression under unconfoundedness is
analogue to assumption 1 and can be re-written as:
Assumption 3 Unconfoundedness in Regression: U0;U1 q D j X:
In the matching framework, the goal is to set the bias B(X) = 0 which basically only
requires that the mean of the error terms in the treatment group given a covariate cell
X equals the corresponding mean in the control group, that is B(X) = E(U1jX;D =
1)¡E(U0jX;D = 0) = 0. Basically, this means that it is possible to match on vari-
ables that are correlated with the error term in the outcome equation (Hui and
Smith, 2002). In the regression framework, however, we need to eliminate the de-
pendence between (U0;U1) and X, that is E(U1jX;D = 1) = E(U0jX;D = 0) = 0
(Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998). Of course, as Smith (2000) notes, the
di®erence between both approaches fades with the inclusion of a su±cient number
of higher-order and interaction terms in the regression. However, not only is such
an inclusion not very common in practice, it is also not straightforward to choose
these terms. Moreover, whereas matching estimators do rely on the common sup-
port assumption, regression estimators do not. Matching ensures that comparisons
between treated and control individuals are only made over the region of common
support. In contrast, standard regression approaches will produce estimates even in
the absence of similar comparison units since the linear functional form assumption
¯lls in for the missing data. The regression identi¯es the untreated outcome model
in the region of the data where the untreated observations lie and then projects
it out into the region of the data where the treated units lie, thereby implicitly
estimating the counterfactual (Smith, 2004). Another key di®erence between re-
gression and matching is the way both approaches handle heterogeneous treatment
e®ects. As Lechner (2002) notes, the non-parametric matching approach leaves the
8individual causal e®ect unrestricted and allows individual e®ect heterogeneity in
the population. This is not true for the regression approach which will not recover
ATT, although, at times it might provide a close approximation as shown by Angrist
(1998) and Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2004).
3.3 Instrumental Variables Estimator
Let us now turn to estimators that account for selection on unobservables, too. We
will start with the method of instrumental variables (IV). Its underlying identi¯ca-
tion strategy is to ¯nd a variable which determines treatment participation but does
not in°uence the outcome equation. The instrumental variable a®ects the observed
outcome only indirectly through the participation decision and hence causal e®ects
can be identi¯ed through a variation in this instrumental variable. IV methods are
extensively discussed in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin
(1996) among others. In terms of the discussion in subsection 2.3, IV requires the
existence of at least one regressor to the decision rule, Z¤, that satis¯es the following
three conditions (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000):
1. Z¤ determines programme participation. For that to be true, it has to have a
non-zero coe±cient in the decision rule in equation 6.
2. We can ¯nd a transformation, s, such that s(Z¤) is uncorrelated with the error
terms (U1;V ) and (U0;V ), given the exogenous variables X.
3. Z¤ is not completely determined by X.
The variable Z¤ is then called the instrument. In providing variation that is cor-
related with the participation decision but does not a®ect potential outcomes from
treatment directly, it can be used as a source of exogenous variation to approxi-
mate randomised trials (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). For a binary instrument
Z¤ 2 f0;1g, we can write the IV estimator as:
¢
IV =
E(Y jX;Z¤ = 1) ¡ E(Y jX;Z¤ = 0)
P(D = 1jX;Z¤ = 1) ¡ P(D = 1jX;Z¤ = 0)
: (15)
Clearly, a major problem with this estimator is to ¯nd a good instrument. In
the treatment evaluation problem it is hard to think of variables that satisfy all
three above mentioned assumptions. The di±culty lies mainly in the simultaneous
requirement that the variable has to predict participation but does not in°uence the
outcome equation.12 As pointed out by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000), a second
drawback arises when considering the heterogeneous treatment framework. Recall
that the error term from equation (11) in subsection 2.4 is given by [U0
it +Dit(U1
it ¡
U0
it)]. Even if Z¤ is uncorrelated with Uit, the same cannot be true by de¯nition
for U0
it + Dit(U1
it ¡ U0
it) since Z¤ determines Di by assumption. The violation of
this assumption invalidates the application of IV methodology in a heterogeneous
12Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) additionally point out that using `weak instruments' may
lead to ine±ciency and possibly also inconsistency of the IV estimates.
9framework (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). However, in this situation it might
still be possible to provide a potentially interesting parameter of the IV estimation
- called local average treatment e®ect (LATE) by Imbens and Angrist (1994). This
estimator identi¯es the treatment e®ect for those individuals (with characteristics
X) who are induced to change behaviour because of a change in the instrument.13
It should be clear that each instrument implies its own LATE, and LATEs for two
di®erent instruments may di®er substantially depending on the impacts realised by
the persons each instrument induces to participate (Hui and Smith, 2002). Hence,
LATE should not be confused with ATE or ATT.14
3.4 Selection Model
This method is also known as the Heckman selection estimator (Heckman, 1978).
It is more robust than the IV method but also more demanding in the sense that it
imposes more assumptions about the structure of the model. Two main assumptions
are required (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000):
1. There has to be one additional regressor in the decision rule which has a non-
zero coe±cient and which is independent of the error term V .
2. Additionally, the joint density of the distribution of the errors Uit and Vi has
to be known or can be estimated.
The basic idea of this estimator is to control directly for the part of the error term
in the outcome equation that is correlated with the participation dummy variable.
It can be seen as a two-step-procedure. First, the part of the error term Uit that is
correlated with Di is estimated. Second, this term is then included in the outcome
equation and the e®ect of the programme is estimated. By construction, the remains
of the error term in the outcome equation are not correlated with the participation
decision any more (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). To explain this estimator, we re-
write the outcome equation in (10) in linear terms as Yi = Xi¯0+®Di+Ui, where we
have dropped the time subscript for convenience. If we assume the popular special
case where Ui and Vi are assumed to follow a joint normal distribution, we may
write the conditional outcome expectations as:
E(YijDi = 1) = ¯ + ® + ½
Á(Zi°)
©(Zi°)
(16)
and
E(YijDi = 0) = ¯ ¡ ½
Á(Zi°)
1 ¡ ©(Zi°)
: (17)
13Additionally to those assumptions already made, we further have to assume that the instrument
has the same directional e®ect on all those whose behaviour it changes. This assumption rules out
the co-existence of de¯ers and compliers and is known as `monotonicity assumption' (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994).
14For continuous instruments Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) de¯ne marginal treatment e®ects
(MTE). This is the e®ect on the person just indi®erent to participate at his current value of the
instrument. They also show that all common treatment e®ects, e.g. ATE and ATT, can be written
as particular integrals of such MTEs.
10The new regressor includes the part of the error term that is correlated with the
decision process in the outcome equation, allowing us to separate the true impact
of the treatment from the selection process. Thus it is possible to identify ® as
outlined above, by replacing ° with ^ ° and running a least-squares regression on
the conditional outcome expectations (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). Blundell
and Costa Dias (2000) also show that this approach is capable of identifying ATT
if e®ects are assumed to be heterogeneous.15 The Heckman selection estimator is
not without critique, which rests mainly on the following point (see e.g. Puhani
(2000)): If there are no exclusion restrictions, the models are identi¯ed only by
assumptions about functional form and error distributions. This may lead to large
standard errors and results that are very sensitive to the particular distributional
assumptions invoked. This point of criticism is very closely related to the problem of
¯nding a good instrument as described for the IV method. In fact, in a recent paper
Vytlacil (2002) shows that the identifying assumptions for the selection model are
equivalent to those invoked by Imbens and Angrist (1994) in the linear instrumental
variables context.
3.5 Di®erence-in-Di®erences Estimator
The di®erence-in-di®erences (DID) estimator requires access to longitudinal data
and can be seen as an extension to the classical before-after estimator (BAE).
Whereas BAE compares outcomes of participants after they participate in the pro-
gramme with their outcomes before they participate, the DID estimator eliminates
common time trends by subtracting the before-after change in non-participant out-
comes from the before-after change for participant outcomes.
The DID-estimator forms simple averages over the group of participants and non-
participants between pre-treatment period t0 and post-treatment period t, that is,
changes in the outcome variable Y for treated individuals are contrasted with the
corresponding changes for non-treated individuals (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and
Todd, 1998):
¢
DID = [Y
1
t ¡ Y
0
t0 j D = 1] ¡ [Y
0
t ¡ Y
0
t0 j D = 0]: (18)
The identifying assumption of this method is:
E(Y
0
t ¡ Y
0
t0 j D = 1) = E(Y
0
t ¡ Y
0
t0 j D = 0): (19)
The DID estimator is based on the assumption of time-invariant linear selection ef-
fects, so that di®erencing the di®erences between participants and non-participants
eliminates the bias (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998). To make this
point clear, we can re-write the outcome for an individual i at time t as: Yit =
¼it + Dit ¢ Y 1
it + (1 ¡ Dit) ¢ Y 0
it, where ¼it captures the e®ects of selection on un-
observables. The validity of the DID estimator then relies on the assumption:
¼it = ¼it0, where it is not required that the bias vanishes completely, but that it
remains constant (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998). One problem when
15However, ATE is not identi¯ed.
11using DID is Ashenfelter's dip, i.e. a situation where shortly before participation
in an ALMP programme the employment situation of future participants deterio-
rates (Ashenfelter, 1978). If the `dip' is transitory and the dip is eventually restored
even in the absence of participation in the programme, the bias will not average
out. To allow a more detailed discussion, Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) further
decompose ¼it in three parts: an individual-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect, a common macro-
economic e®ect and a temporary individual-speci¯c e®ect. Clearly, for the DID to
be unbiased it is su±cient that selection into treatment is independent from the
temporary individual-speci¯c e®ect, since the other two e®ects vanish in the sequen-
tial di®erences. They also discuss the case where the macroeconomic e®ect has a
di®erential impact across the group of participants and non-participants. This may
happen when both groups di®er on unobserved characteristics which make them
react di®erently to macroeconomic shocks. To overcome this problem they pro-
pose a di®erential trend adjusted DID estimator (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002).
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) combine the DID approach with the
already presented matching estimator by comparing the before-after outcome of
participants with those of matched non-participants. Smith and Todd (2005) show
that this `conditional DID estimator' is more robust than traditional cross-section
matching estimators, as it allows selection on observables as well as time-invariant
selection on unobservables.
3.6 Regression Discontinuity Model
The regression discontinuity model (RDM) can be seen as a particular type of in-
strumental variable identi¯cation strategy. It uses discontinuities in the selection
process to identify causal e®ects. In this model, treatment depends on some ob-
served variable, Z, according to a known, deterministic rule, such as D = 1 if Z > Z
and D = 0 otherwise (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). The variable Z has
direct impact on Y as well as an indirect impact on Y through D. This indirect
impact is the causal e®ect we would like to identify. FrÄ olich (2002) notes that this
e®ect is identi¯ed if the direct and indirect impacts of Z on Y can be separated.
A good example is given by Angrist and Lavy (1999). They estimate the e®ects of
the size of school classes on test scores of pupils. The discontinuity stems from a
rule that classes with more than 40 pupils have to be divided in two, such that in
each class remain on average 20.5 pupils. The treatment in this case is the fact of
being in a class which has been divided due to reaching the maximum size of 41
pupils. Clearly, in this example class size a®ects the test scores of the pupils di-
rectly but also indirectly through D. Other examples are given by Hahn, Todd, and
Van der Klaauw (1999), who analyse the e®ect of antidiscrimination laws of minor-
ity workers by exploiting the fact that only ¯rms with more than 15 employees are
subject to these laws. Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1980) consider a hypothetical
enrichment programme for disadvantaged children, where children with a family in-
come below a cut-o® level receive the programme and all others do not. Whenever
such deterministic rules are in place, RDD might be a possibility to estimate causal
e®ects.
12There are several things to note about RDM (see e.g. Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith (1999)). First, it is assumed that selection is on observable characteristics
only. Second, it should be clear that there is no common support for participants
and non-participants making matching impossible. Hence, RDM takes over when
there is selection on observables (here: the deterministic rule) but the overlapping
support condition required for matching breaks down (with a certain Z you either
belong to the participant or the non-participant group). Finally, the selection rule is
assumed to be deterministic and known and that variation in the relevant variable
Z is exogenous (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001).
3.7 Dynamic Evaluation Concepts
3.7.1 Sequential Matching Estimators
What we have discussed so far is basically a static evaluation framework where
an individual can participate in one programme (or not). A recent extension of
this framework for matching estimators considers the case, where individuals can
participate in subsequent treatments. Lechner and Miquel (2002) discuss identifying
assumptions for so-called sequential matching estimators. These estimators mimic
the matching estimators described above but allow to estimate e®ects in a dynamic
causal model. Their framework can be made clear in a three-periods-two-treatments
model. We follow the discussion in Lechner (2004) and present the needed additional
notation in the following. First, we introduce a time index t 2 f0;1;2g and extend
the treatment indicator D by this time index, that is D = (D0;D1;D2). It is
further assumed that in period 0 everybody is in the same treatment state D0 = 0,
whereas from the second period on Dt can take two values. Realisations of Dt are
denoted by dt 2 f0;1g. So in period 1 an individual is observed in exactly one
of these two treatments (0;1), whereas in period 2 an individual participates in
one of four possible treatment sequences f(0;0);(1;0);(0;1);(1;1)g. Additionally,
the history of variables up to period t are denoted by a bar below a variable, e.g.
d2 = (d1;d2). The potential outcomes are indexed by treatments and the time
period, i.e. Y st = (Y
dt
0 ;Y
dt
1 ;Y
dt
2 ). The observed outcomes are given by the following
equation:
Yt = D1Y
1
t + (1 ¡ D1)Y
0
t = D1D2Y
1;1
t + D1(1 ¡ D2)Y
1;0
t + (20)
(1 ¡ D1)D2Y
0;1
t + (1 ¡ D1)(1 ¡ D2)Y
0;0
t :
As in the static model, variables that in°uence treatment selection and potential
outcomes are called attributes and are denoted by X. An important distinction has
to be made regarding the exogeneity of these variables. Whereas in the static model
exogeneity is assumed, in the dynamic model the X-variables in later periods can
be in°uenced by treatment realisations. Hence, there are potential values of these
variables as well: Xdt = (X
dt
0 ;X
dt
1 ;X
dt
2 ), where e.g. X
d1
1 may contain Y
d1
1 or functions
of it. The sequential matching framework is a powerful tool and is applicable for
13situations where individuals can participate more than once in a programme and
where it is possible to identify treatment sequences. It allows intermediate outcomes
to play a role in the participation decision for sequential participation and thus allows
estimation in a dynamic context. Since Lechner (2004) presents the only application
so far, practical experiences with this identifying strategy are rather limited.
3.7.2 Duration Models
Another methodology for modelling dynamically assigned treatments is the appli-
cation of duration models (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). This approach of
the evaluation of an ALMP programme is done with a bivariate duration model.
Normalising the point in time when an individual enters unemployment to zero, Te
denotes the duration until the individual enters a regular employment and Tp the
duration until the individual enters an ALMP training programme with realisations
tu and tp respectively. The durations Te and Tp are assumed to vary with observable
characteristics x and unobservable characteristics ve and vp. Abbring and van den
Berg (2003) assume that the realisation tp a®ects the distribution of Te in a deter-
ministic way from tp onwards and consider not only the binary information if an
individual participates in a programme, but also the additional information on the
timing of the treatment within the unemployment spell.
For the speci¯cation of the hazard rates a mixed proportional hazard model is used.
Basic feature of this model is that the duration dependence, observable and unob-
servable covariates enter the hazard rate multiplicatively:
µe(tjtp;x;ve) = ¸e(t)exp[x
0¯e + ¹(t ¡ tp)I(t > tp) + ve] (21)
µp(tjx;vp) = ¸p(t)exp[x
0¯p + vp] (22)
The hazard rate for the transition into regular employment at time t consists of
the baseline hazard ¸e(t) that determines the duration dependence, the systematic
part exp(x0¯e) that determines the individual level of the hazard rate conditional on
the observable characteristics and the unobserved heterogeneity term exp(ve) that
determines the level of the hazard conditional on the unobserved characteristics. The
treatment e®ect exp[¹(t¡tp)I(t > tp)] with I(t > tp) as an indicator function taking
the value 1 if t > tp, is speci¯ed as a function of the di®erence t ¡ tp. In general we
allow the treatment e®ect to vary over the time after the treatment has started. The
treatment e®ect can be interpreted as a shift of the hazard rate by exp(¹(t ¡ tp)).
The transition rate from unemployment into programme participation is analogously
speci¯ed as a mixed proportional hazard model with the baseline hazard ¸p(t), the
systematic part exp(x0¯p) and the unobserved heterogeneity term exp(vp).
As stated by Abbring and van den Berg (2003) for the identi¯cation of the treatment
e®ect, the selectivity of the programme participation must be considered. Selectivity
is present if individuals with a relatively high transition rate into employment also
have a relatively high transition into programme participation. If we observe such
a pattern this can result from two sources. First, a positive treatment e®ect rises
14for the group of participants the transition rate into regular employment. Second,
individuals with treatment have a relatively high ve and therefore have a higher
transition rate anyway. In the second case we obviously would observe a positive
correlation between ve and vp. Therefore the joint distribution G(ve;vp) has to
be speci¯ed. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) show that the bivariate model
(21) and (22) and especially the treatment e®ect is identi¯ed. The identi¯cation is
nonparametric, since it does not require any parametric assumptions with respect
to the baseline hazard and the unobserved heterogeneity distribution (Abbring and
van den Berg, 2003). Furthermore the identi¯cation does not require exclusion
restrictions on x which are often hardly to justify from a theoretical point of view.
The speci¯ed model for the transition rates µe and µp rules out any anticipatory
e®ects of vocational training programmes. An anticipatory e®ect is given if the
realisation tp has an e®ect on µe before tp. However these e®ects can be modelled by
an additional treatment state in the framework of a duration model (Abbring and
van den Berg, 2003).
3.7.3 Matching with Time-Varying Treatment Indicators
An alternative concept of modelling dynamic treatment e®ects is presented by
Fredriksson and Johansson (2004) and Sianesi (2004). They introduce a non-para-
metric matching estimator that takes the timing of events into account but does
not rely on proportionality assumptions. An important topic in this framework is
the choice of an appropriate control group. Instead of de¯ning control individuals
as those who never participate, Sianesi (2004) de¯nes control individuals as those
who did not participate until a certain time period. Fredriksson and Johansson
(2004) formalise her approach and argue that the standard way of de¯ning a control
group, i.e. those individuals who never participated in a given time interval, might
lead to biased results, because the CIA might be violated as the treatment indicator
itself is de¯ned conditional on future outcomes. Following Sianesi (2004), the key
choice faced by the unemployed in this framework is not whether to participate at
all, but whether to participate in a programme or not now. In the latter case, the
individual searches longer in open unemployment. The corresponding parameter of
interest in this setting is then de¯ned as the e®ect of joining a programme now in
contrast to waiting longer. The population of interest at time u are those still openly
unemployed after u months. Treatment receipt in u is denoted by D(u) = 1. The
comparison group consists of all persons who do not join at least up to u, denoted
by D(u) = 0. The outcome of interest is de¯ned over time t and is given by Y
(u)
t .
The potential outcome if an individual joins in u is denoted by Y
1(u)
t and if he does
not join at least up to u by Y
0(u)
t . For each point of elapsed unemployment duration
the parameter of interest is:
¢
t
u = E(Y
1(u)
t ¡ Y
0(u)
t jD
(u) = 1) = E(Y
1(u)
t jD
(u) = 1) (23)
¡E(Y
0(u)
t jD
(u) = 1); for t = u;u + 1;:::;T:
This is the average impact at time t, for those joining a programme in their uth month
of unemployment compared to waiting longer in open unemployment. Sianesi (2004)
15notes that the treatment e®ects are based on a comparison of individuals who have
reached the same elapsed duration of unemployment. Measurement starts at time u,
the start of the programme and therefore possible locking-in e®ects might encounter.
The second term on the right hand side is not identi¯ed and the CIA needed in that
case is given by:
Y
0(u)
t q D
(u)jX = x for t = u;u + 1;:::;T; (24)
which means that given a set of observed characteristics X, the counterfactual dis-
tribution of Y
0(u)
t for individuals joining in u is the same as for those not joining
in u and waiting longer. The estimated treatment e®ect is then the e®ect for those
who participate in a programme at some time in their unemployment spell instead
of waiting longer. Even though this is not a standard evaluation parameter of in-
terest, it still shows whether a programme was e®ective or not. In a recent paper,
Steiger (2004) compares the sensitivity of the e®ects of Swiss labour market policy
with respect to the de¯nition of the non-participant group and makes clear that
further research in this direction is fruitful for evaluating labour market policies.
Bergemann, Fitzenberger, and Speckesser (2004) combine duration modelling with
the already discussed conditional DID estimator to a `dynamic conditional DID es-
timator in hazard rates' and estimate the employment e®ects of vocational training
in East Germany.
4 Summary - Which Estimator to Choose?
We have presented several di®erent evaluation strategies in this paper. The ¯nal
question to be answered is: Which strategy to choose when evaluating labour market
programmes? Unfortunately, there is no `one' answer to this question because there
is no `magic bullet' that will solve the evaluation problem in any case. As described
above, di®erent strategies invoke di®erent identifying assumptions and also require
di®erent kinds of data for their implementation. When those assumptions hold, a
given estimator will provide consistent estimates of certain parameters of interest
(Smith, 2004). The literature provides a lot of guidance for making the right choice,
based either on experimental datasets to benchmark the performance of alternative
evaluation estimators or Monte-Carlo simulations.16
The di®erent estimators can be classi¯ed with respect to two dimensions. The ¯rst
dimension is the required data for their implementation. Except the DID estima-
tor, the presented methods for the static evaluation framework require only cross-
sectional information for the group of participants and non-participants. However,
longitudinal information might help to justify the unconfoundedness assumption,
enables the researcher to combine e.g. matching with DID estimators and allows
an extension to dynamic concepts of treatment evaluation. The second dimension
16See LaLonde (1986), Heckman and Hotz (1989), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998)
and Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) among others for experimental evidence and e.g. Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1999) for Monte-Carlo simulations.
16concerns the handling of selection bias. We have presented three estimators that
are based on the unconfoundedness assumption. Clearly, the most crucial point for
these estimators is that the identifying assumption is in general a very strong one
and they are only as good as the used control variables X (Blundell, Dearden, and
Sianesi, 2004). If the assumption holds, both matching and regression, can be used.
Since regression analysis ignores the common support problem, imposes a functional
form for the outcome equation, and is not as capable as matching of handling e®ect
heterogeneity, matching might be preferred. If there is no common support at all,
regression discontinuity models can be applied. For the situation where there is se-
lection on unobservables, too, we have presented three strategies. Whereas selection
models try to model the selection process completely, IV methods focus on searching
a source of independent variation a®ecting the participation decision (but not the
outcome) and DID methods erase a time-invariant selection e®ect by di®erencing
outcomes of participants and non-participants before and after treatment took place.
The crucial assumption for the latter approach is that the selection bias is time in-
variant. Finding a suitable and credible instrument and heterogeneous treatment
e®ects are possible drawbacks for the IV method. The latter point is not a problem
for selection models17, even though this °exibility comes at a price, because a full
speci¯cation of the assignment rule and stronger assumptions are required. Hence,
if the common e®ect assumption is plausible in a given context, the IV estimator
might be preferred (Smith, 2004). Finally, we have also presented some recent ex-
tensions of the static evaluation framework to analyse dynamic treatment e®ects.
The sequential matching estimator is a powerful tool, if individuals can participate
in subsequent treatments. Duration models play an important role if the timing
of events, i.e. the time until the treatment and/or the transition to a job occurs,
shall be taken into account. Finally, we have also discussed matching estimators
with a time-varying treatment indicator where the estimated treatment e®ect is the
e®ect for those individuals who participate in a programme at some time in their
unemployment spell instead of waiting longer.
Let us conclude this paper with a somewhat obvious quote from Smith (2000):
`Better data helps a lot!'. The discussion has shown that each non-experimental
estimation strategy relies on identifying assumptions and has to be justi¯ed case-
by-case. In an ideal world, the evaluator is already involved at early stages of
the programme design and has in°uence on the data collected for later evaluation.
In that case, one can make sure to collect those data needed to justify either the
unconfoundedness assumption or to create an instrument (exclusion restriction) that
allows the use of IV methods or selection models. If the evaluator is instead faced
with an ongoing programme, he carefully has to assess which identi¯cation strategy
works for the situation at hand, taking the design of the programme, the selection
process, and the available data into account.
17BjÄ orklund and Mo±t (1987) were the ¯rst who discussed this extension.
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